A Threshold That Guarantees Failure
Some libs (okay, pretty much all of them) just refuse to get it about the Iraqi constitution. Which means that some libs want Iraq right back the way it was before we liberated the country, which would be the likely end result of its defeat.
Here's an example, courtesy of Slate's Fred Kaplan:
There's far less "chaos" than preached by the conventional wisdom it doesn't occur to him to question. But this prescription would gin it back up to those levels, which would be just fine with Kaplan.
Why does he think passing the constitution would be a bad idea? Because the Sunnis don't like it:
Kaplan's right. The proposed Iraqi constitution doesn't satisfy all key factions. In that sense it enjoys the company of every other constitution that has ever been written. There's no such thing as a constitution that is universally accepted by all who will be subject to its dictates. Surely our own Constitution wasn't, which is why it took two full years to hash it out and then another two years before the requisite nine of thirteen states ratified it, and even then not everybody was happy with it.
But that's one of the first lessons of democracy: to borrow an old Rolling Stones title, "You can't always get what you want." What a constitutional system does ensure is that everybody has access to the political system for redress of grievances and sought-after modifications and all the other untidy fiddle-faddle of a free governing system. Democracy, in whichever form, whether parliamentary or republican, is a massive mess of competing interests that "legitimately play themselves out" by way of ballots and laws and process instead of terrorism and IEDs and suicide bombings.
Frankly, the Sunnis, being not even 20% of the Iraqi population, shouldn't be entitled to disproportionate deference. Yet Kaplan is essentially saying that they should have a veto over the entire process. That is all the less convincing an argument given that it is the Sunnis, whether ex-Saddamites or, more predominantly, foreign Sunni al Qaedaites, who have mounted the "insurgency" since before Iraq even regained its official sovereignty. It stands to reason to conclude that the Sunni faction will never accept anything less than the total dominance they enjoyed for decades under Saddam, and before that Iraq's British colonial overseers. Since they've fought democratization rabidly from day one, why should their grievances be given such undue consideration?
And yet the Kurds and Shi'ites did consider Sunni objections. They bent over backwards to placate the old Saddamite rump areas, even going a week past the deadline for completion of the document to try and woo them into signing off on it. And the Sunnis, who were unwilling, in the democratic tradition, to accept half a loaf in lieu of the entire bakery, still balked.
So the other two factions concluded deliberations, finalized the constitution, and the vote is going ahead next month, as scheduled. That's as it should be, because in a democracy, it's not about factions but about the process. Since the Sunnis alternated between attacking the process from without and undermining it from within but always remained outside of it, their continuing, unreasonable objections carry no weight and no credibility.
If the Sunnis are given a veto, there will never be a legitimate (i.e. non-Sunni-dominated) constitution, and the "insurgency" will just keep going until Iraqis sour on the very concept of democracy, we finally tire of the whole thing and leave regardless, and the country degenerates back into dicatorship.
Kinda like what happened in South Vietnam.
And that's an outcome about which people like Fred Kaplan would not feel dismay, but savage elation.
Here's an example, courtesy of Slate's Fred Kaplan:
When Iraqis go to the polls October 15 to vote on the constitution, it would probably be best if they rejected it. Elections for a new parliament are scheduled to take place this December in any case. Let them be for a new constitutional assembly (as current law provides in the event of a rejection), and let the process start over again. Further delay may prolong the chaos, but passage of this parchment will almost certainly make things worse—and for much longer still.
There's far less "chaos" than preached by the conventional wisdom it doesn't occur to him to question. But this prescription would gin it back up to those levels, which would be just fine with Kaplan.
Why does he think passing the constitution would be a bad idea? Because the Sunnis don't like it:
[T]he whole point of a constitution is to establish a foundation of consensus, to put forth a rule book that's accepted (even if reluctantly) by all the key factions; in short, to lay the groundwork on which politics can legitimately be played out.
This, Iraq's constitution clearly does not do.
Kaplan's right. The proposed Iraqi constitution doesn't satisfy all key factions. In that sense it enjoys the company of every other constitution that has ever been written. There's no such thing as a constitution that is universally accepted by all who will be subject to its dictates. Surely our own Constitution wasn't, which is why it took two full years to hash it out and then another two years before the requisite nine of thirteen states ratified it, and even then not everybody was happy with it.
But that's one of the first lessons of democracy: to borrow an old Rolling Stones title, "You can't always get what you want." What a constitutional system does ensure is that everybody has access to the political system for redress of grievances and sought-after modifications and all the other untidy fiddle-faddle of a free governing system. Democracy, in whichever form, whether parliamentary or republican, is a massive mess of competing interests that "legitimately play themselves out" by way of ballots and laws and process instead of terrorism and IEDs and suicide bombings.
Frankly, the Sunnis, being not even 20% of the Iraqi population, shouldn't be entitled to disproportionate deference. Yet Kaplan is essentially saying that they should have a veto over the entire process. That is all the less convincing an argument given that it is the Sunnis, whether ex-Saddamites or, more predominantly, foreign Sunni al Qaedaites, who have mounted the "insurgency" since before Iraq even regained its official sovereignty. It stands to reason to conclude that the Sunni faction will never accept anything less than the total dominance they enjoyed for decades under Saddam, and before that Iraq's British colonial overseers. Since they've fought democratization rabidly from day one, why should their grievances be given such undue consideration?
And yet the Kurds and Shi'ites did consider Sunni objections. They bent over backwards to placate the old Saddamite rump areas, even going a week past the deadline for completion of the document to try and woo them into signing off on it. And the Sunnis, who were unwilling, in the democratic tradition, to accept half a loaf in lieu of the entire bakery, still balked.
So the other two factions concluded deliberations, finalized the constitution, and the vote is going ahead next month, as scheduled. That's as it should be, because in a democracy, it's not about factions but about the process. Since the Sunnis alternated between attacking the process from without and undermining it from within but always remained outside of it, their continuing, unreasonable objections carry no weight and no credibility.
If the Sunnis are given a veto, there will never be a legitimate (i.e. non-Sunni-dominated) constitution, and the "insurgency" will just keep going until Iraqis sour on the very concept of democracy, we finally tire of the whole thing and leave regardless, and the country degenerates back into dicatorship.
Kinda like what happened in South Vietnam.
And that's an outcome about which people like Fred Kaplan would not feel dismay, but savage elation.
posted by JASmius at 4:35 PM
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