The Blueprint Of Defeat

"The disputes over the strategy for Iraq could get boiled down to three directions: go big, go home, or go long." So writes the Admiral this morning. I translate that as winning, losing quickly, or losing slowly. Which makes this WaPo story more sobering than even Ed seems to think:

U.S. military officials here are increasingly envisioning a "post-occupation" troop presence in Iraq that neither maintains current levels nor leads to a complete pullout, but aims for a smaller, longer-term force that would remain in the country for years.

This goal, drawn from recent interviews with more than 20 U.S. military officers and other officials here, including senior commanders, strategists and analysts, remains in the early planning stages. It is based on officials' assessment that a sharp drawdown of troops is likely to begin by the middle of next year, with roughly two-thirds of the current force of 150,000 moving out by late 2008 or early 2009. The questions officials are grappling with are not whether the U.S. presence will be cut, but how quickly, to what level and to what purpose.

One of the guiding principles, according to two officials here, is that the United States should leave Iraq more intelligently than it entered. Military officials, many of whom would be interviewed only on the condition of anonymity, say they are now assessing conditions more realistically, rejecting the "steady progress" mantra of their predecessors and recognizing that short-term political reconciliation in Iraq is unlikely. A reduction of troops, some officials argue, would demonstrate to anti-American factions that the occupation will not last forever while reassuring Iraqi allies that the United States does not intend to abandon the country.

The planning is shaped in part by logistical realities in Iraq. The immediate all-or-nothing debate in Washington over troop levels represents a false dilemma, some military officials said. Even if a total pullout is the goal, it could take a year to execute a full withdrawal. One official estimated that with only one major route from the country - through southern Iraq to Kuwait - it would take at least 3,000 large convoys some ten months to remove U.S. military gear and personnel alone, not including the several thousand combat vehicles that would be needed to protect such an operation.

Don't you just love euphemisms like "troop drawdown"? "Smaller, longer-term force"? Like you can fight a war and quit a war at the same time. And this is what they call "leaving Iraq more intelligently than we entered"?

Let's call it what it really is: spinning self-inflicted defeat. In war, everything is about momentum. In this case, no matter what window dressing is put on it, no matter the quality and shade of lipstick applied to this pig, it is still a retreat from Iraq, which is to say a retreat from al Qaeda and Iranian irregulars.

Moreover, the notion that we can "draw down" a hundred thousand troops and still keep the other fifty thousand there is, not to put too fine a point on it, sheer fantasy. Don't think so? Look at the assumptions inherent in this proposal:

This plan anticipates some rather striking developments. Chief among them: the willingness of Moqtada al-Sadr to engage in diplomacy rather than warfare. The Maliki government indicates that Sadr will negotiate for an end to his insurgency once he sees the US willing to significantly reduce its forces in Iraq. Sadr will have little objection to American forces remaining behind to target al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgencies, most believe, but wants to see an end to American troops in the capital first.

"Striking"? Try "delusional". Of course Sadr wants to see an end to US troops in Baghdad; he works for the Iranians, for heaven's sake. If American forces leave Baghdad, the mullahs' proxies and al Qaeda will have the capital to themselves, the Maliki government won't last a week, a bloodbath on a scale not seen since the Cambodian killing fields will descend, and Iraq itself will fall soon thereafter.

Again, if you think this too pessimistic an assessment, look at what is supposed to fill the vacuum our men & women will leave in their wake:

It also relies on the Iraqi Army to maintain its strength after our departure. If the Iraqi Army can succeed in holding the areas we clear as part of the surge strategy, then the central government can gain credibility and encourage an amnesty for native insurgents, allowing them to re-enter Iraqi politics legitimately. This amnesty got scotched after Congress objected last year, but it will eventually have to happen if the Iraqis expect to return to a civil society.

I'll just pose a two-part question: Why would the Iraqi Army remain intact if they see their erstwhile benefactors abandoning them to their enemies - again? And why would native "insurgents" lay down their arms and "re-enter Iraqi politics" when they see the infidels running away - again?

All of the above leads to Ed's less than sanguine conclusion:

That's a lot of assumptions, and any failure among them would doom Iraq to a bloody collapse. In that event, we would find our 10,000-man force - the size anticipated in this strategy - beleaguered on all sides and probably unable to extricate themselves quickly. It presents a huge risk not just to them, but to the stability of the states surrounding Iraq. [emphases added]

Ten thousand men aren't a "smaller, long-term force"; they're designated hostages. And this "plan" is nothing more than Pentagon spin for the second unnecessary, unforced, ignominious defeat inflicted upon them by the American Left in as many generations.

Bin Laden was right. We are a paper tiger. And the next front in the War Against Islamic Fundamentalism will be a lot closer to our shores, launched from the prime piece of geostrategic Middle East real estate we're handing to them, and their mullahgarchic masters.