Alternating Currents
As I rummage through the odds and ends of recent memory, I keep coming across this quaint recollection about any group or regime being in league with al Qaeda and the Taliban after 9/11 being an enemy of the United States. I believe President Bush's phrase was, "You are either with us, or you're with the terrorists." And any who are with the terrorists were doomed to face our ass-kicking wrath.
Well, here's yet another news flash: Iran is with the terrorists - and I don't mean just Hezbollah:
So, the mullahs aided al Qaeda right after 9/11, and they're aiding al Qaeda to this day. Doesn't that make them our enemy? As though that fact hasn't been made dolefully obvious for the past twenty-seven years? Well, to everybody outside the Beltway, anyway. Makes me wonder what it would take to (1) convince official Washington that the mullahs are our enemies, (2) convince official Washington that it is pointless and dangerous to keep pursuing "diplomacy" with them, and (3) convince official Washington that the only viable alternative is to do to them what we did to Saddam Hussein nearly four years ago. In all liklihood the answer is probably something that would render the whole idea moot (like, say, an EMP attack). Certainly nothing short of Iranian amphibious landings on the Eastern seaboard would seem to be able to penetrate the impregnable pacifistic armor that guards any and all approaches to the Foggy Bottom collective consciousness.
Still, although the strategic alignment has never been more favorable for Iranian global triumph, they're still having their own troubles. Though I don't consider this story to be one of them:
All of which might have some meaning if there were actually such a thing as Iranian democracy. In truth, Iranian "election" results have nothing to do with the will of the people and everything to do with the whims of the mullahs, who hold the real power:
How does this affect Ahmadinejad's near future, particularly in light of his apparently growing unpopularity? Most likely to take him out of any possibility of ascending to the true power in Iran by succeeding Khamenei, by hook or by crook.
You have to understand what the purpose of the Iranian presidency is. The aforelinked Michael Ledeen elaborates:
This fang-baring took place over a year ago, before the mullahs' burgeoning self-confidence was bolstered and vindicated by the defeatist/appeasenik results of the American mid-term elections. Indeed, so enhanced must Ahmadinejad's position have become that his bosses decided to take him down a few notches for the protection of their own power, especially in light of the "Supreme Leader's" not being long for this world.
But here is the key thing to understand about Iran:
There will be no revolution like the one that installed the ayahtollahs in 1979. Those that attain power by force are the hardest ones to overthrow by the same means because they know best how to guard against the same fate befalling them. While I have no objection to Mr. Ledeen's endless calls to support democratic uprisings in Iran (hey, you never know), I think that basing our war policy on such wishful thinking is as foolish as relying upon the fantasy of "diplomacy" to reach a "regional settlement" with Tehran as though the mullahs were sane, reasonable people.
The mullahgarchy will not be overthrown from within, and it will pursue its war against us until we and our allies are destroyed. They only way to stop them is to engage them in the combat they so nakedly desire and crush them beneath our heel.
That brings us to a genuine point of Iranian vulnerability that we can easily exploit:
Never mind UN sanctions, which are wholly irrelevant to this confrontation. Even if they weren't so watered-down, economic sanctions never dissuaded any dictator from a chosen course of action. Certainly Saddam Hussein didn't suffer from them (just his people, and they were as irrelevant as the Iranian people are to their captors' policies).
However, what the London Guardian fearfully laments as a possible consequence of this toothless gesture is, in fact, precisely the form that economic sanctions should take. The Iranian economy is heavily dependent upon oil and natural gas exports, and the bulk of those exports have to go through the Strait of Hormuz. That suggests two self-evident factors: (1) the mullahs are bluffing about closing the strait themselves; and (2) that is precisely what we should do to bring about the mullahgarchy's fall. The Iranian economy, already is pretty sad shape, would rapidly collapse, the circumstances for a successful popular uprising would actually exist, and it might still be possible that regime-change could be effected in Tehran without a US-led invasion.
There you go. Impose economic sanctions worthy of the name by blockading the Persian Gulf, lend maximum support to an Iranian democratic insurgency, and wait for the mullahgarchy to topple.
Will we do that? Hell, no.
But since the '06 mid-term election, the pump price at my neighborhood filling station has risen thirty-four cents a gallon. So obviously the market is reacting to the high liklihood of an American retreat from the Middle East and like Iranian triumph. Could hanging the chief terror masters with their own commodity rope really be that much more economically painful, even in the short term?
No, not really. But that would require courage, foresight, and "realism"; commodities that are in dangerously short supply these days, as every last window of opportunity to avoid Armageddon slams shut one by one.
Well, here's yet another news flash: Iran is with the terrorists - and I don't mean just Hezbollah:
Irrespective of the outcome of the James case, the mere suggestion that Iran should be seeking to recruit someone with access to the innermost counsels of NATO's high command is indicative both of Teheran's intense interest in NATO's activities in Afghanistan, and its determination to ensure that the West is not allowed to succeed in transforming the country from Islamic dictatorship into stable democracy.
It also makes a mockery of the recent suggestion, advanced in both Washington and London, that the only way to resolve the region's difficulties is by engaging in a constructive dialogue with Teheran. Whether it be in Iraq or Afghanistan, the over-riding priority of the regime of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is to ensure the coalition's efforts at nation-building end in failure.
As in Iraq, the history of Iran's involvement in Afghanistan has been complex, but rarely benign. During the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, the Iranians supported one of the fiercest Mujahideen groups. More recently, the Iranians helped hundreds of al-Qa'eda fighters to escape from Afghanistan following the coalition's military campaign to remove the Taliban from power in 2001. Recent intelligence reports have indicated that many senior al-Qa'eda leaders — including two of Osama bin Laden's sons — are still living in Teheran under the protection of the Revolutionary Guards, where they are being groomed for a possible takeover of the al-Qa'eda leadership. [emphasis added]
So, the mullahs aided al Qaeda right after 9/11, and they're aiding al Qaeda to this day. Doesn't that make them our enemy? As though that fact hasn't been made dolefully obvious for the past twenty-seven years? Well, to everybody outside the Beltway, anyway. Makes me wonder what it would take to (1) convince official Washington that the mullahs are our enemies, (2) convince official Washington that it is pointless and dangerous to keep pursuing "diplomacy" with them, and (3) convince official Washington that the only viable alternative is to do to them what we did to Saddam Hussein nearly four years ago. In all liklihood the answer is probably something that would render the whole idea moot (like, say, an EMP attack). Certainly nothing short of Iranian amphibious landings on the Eastern seaboard would seem to be able to penetrate the impregnable pacifistic armor that guards any and all approaches to the Foggy Bottom collective consciousness.
Still, although the strategic alignment has never been more favorable for Iranian global triumph, they're still having their own troubles. Though I don't consider this story to be one of them:
As protests broke out last week at a prestigious university here, cutting short a speech by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Babak Zamanian could only watch from afar. He was on crutches, having been clubbed by supporters of the president and had his foot run over by a motorcycle during a less publicized student demonstration a few days earlier.
But the significance of the confrontation was easy to grasp, even from a distance, said Mr. Zamanian, a leader of a student political group.
The Iranian student movement, which planned the 1979 seizure of the United States Embassy from the same university, Amir Kabir, is reawakening from the slumber of recent years and may even be spearheading a widespread resistance against Mr. Ahmadinejad. This time the catalysts were academic and personal freedom. ...
The protest, punctuated by shouts of “Death to the dictator,” was the first widely publicized outcry against Mr. Ahmadinejad, one that was reflected Friday in local elections, where voters turned out in droves to vote for his opponents.
All of which might have some meaning if there were actually such a thing as Iranian democracy. In truth, Iranian "election" results have nothing to do with the will of the people and everything to do with the whims of the mullahs, who hold the real power:
The Iranian electoral ritual doesn’t tell us what the people want; it tells us what the tyrants have decided. This time, the decision had to do with the very intense power struggle going on inside the regime, catalyzed by the recent evidence of the worsening health of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In considerable pain from his cancer, for which he consumes a considerable quantity of opium syrup, Khamenei recently was forced to spend 2-3 days in a Tehran hospital after complaining of a loss of feeling in his feet and breaking out in a cold sweat. His doctors told him several months ago that he was unlikely to survive much past the end of March, and he seems to be more or less on schedule.
How does this affect Ahmadinejad's near future, particularly in light of his apparently growing unpopularity? Most likely to take him out of any possibility of ascending to the true power in Iran by succeeding Khamenei, by hook or by crook.
You have to understand what the purpose of the Iranian presidency is. The aforelinked Michael Ledeen elaborates:
[T]he position of president of the Islamic Republic doesn’t bestow much in the way of executive power. It’s always gone to a person who can play a largely deceptive role in world affairs. Prior to the current holder, we had Khatami-the-reformer-who-never-reformed-anything, a man who gave politically correct speeches calling for a dialogue among civilizations and whispering soft words to Western intellectuals and diplomats at the same time he ruthlessly purged anything free anywhere in the country, and presided over the murders of students, professors, and other dissidents. That was a period when Iran sought to lull the West into the arms of Morpheus, distracting attention from the real horrors of the regime and its preparations for war against us, including the nuclear program.
With Ahmadinejad, the mullahs bared their fangs to us. Convinced they were winning in Iraq, foreseeing the destruction of Israel, the domination of Lebanon, a jihadist reconquista in Afghanistan and the expansion of their domain into the Horn of Africa, they gave us the face of the unrepentant conqueror. He’s played his role well, and he will continue to play it. Just yesterday he proclaimed that Iran has become “a nuclear power,” leaving us to wonder exactly what that means. Is it the bomb? Or is it a technical advance that will lead to a bomb? Whatever it means, it’s an act of defiance, a reassertion of Iran’s will to prosecute the twenty-seven year old war they have waged against us ever since Khomeini’s seizure of power.
This fang-baring took place over a year ago, before the mullahs' burgeoning self-confidence was bolstered and vindicated by the defeatist/appeasenik results of the American mid-term elections. Indeed, so enhanced must Ahmadinejad's position have become that his bosses decided to take him down a few notches for the protection of their own power, especially in light of the "Supreme Leader's" not being long for this world.
But here is the key thing to understand about Iran:
The war policy is not in dispute among the rulers of Iran, whether they call themselves reformers or hard-liners. Nor is the decision to use the iron fist of the regime against any and all advocates of freedom for the Iranian people. What is decidedly at the center of the current fighting within the regime - a fight that has already produced spectacular assassinations, masqueraded as airplane crashes, of a significant number of military commanders, including the commander of the ground forces of the powerful Revolutionary Guards - is the Really Big Question, indeed the only question that really matters: Who will succeed Khamenei? [emphasis added]
There will be no revolution like the one that installed the ayahtollahs in 1979. Those that attain power by force are the hardest ones to overthrow by the same means because they know best how to guard against the same fate befalling them. While I have no objection to Mr. Ledeen's endless calls to support democratic uprisings in Iran (hey, you never know), I think that basing our war policy on such wishful thinking is as foolish as relying upon the fantasy of "diplomacy" to reach a "regional settlement" with Tehran as though the mullahs were sane, reasonable people.
The mullahgarchy will not be overthrown from within, and it will pursue its war against us until we and our allies are destroyed. They only way to stop them is to engage them in the combat they so nakedly desire and crush them beneath our heel.
That brings us to a genuine point of Iranian vulnerability that we can easily exploit:
The United Nations security council is finally expected to pass a resolution [Fri]day to impose international sanctions on Iran for the first time since the 1979 revolution, a punitive move that will heighten diplomatic tensions and risks a military confrontation in the Gulf.
Iran has threatened immediate retaliation, even though the proposed sanctions have been significantly watered down this week. Tehran's options include withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN nuclear watchdog, which would mean Iran would conduct its nuclear programme free from international monitoring, and possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the channel for 20% of the world's oil supplies.
Western diplomats think that the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his colleagues are bluffing but, just in case, the US announced this week it is reinforcing its fleet in the Gulf.
The British government is also increasing its naval presence. Two minehunters arrived in Bahrain on Tuesday but the Ministry of Defence said their deployment was mainly for training with Gulf states and "not to counter any increased threat". Tony Blair, on a visit to the Middle East this week, portrayed Iran as a major threat.
Never mind UN sanctions, which are wholly irrelevant to this confrontation. Even if they weren't so watered-down, economic sanctions never dissuaded any dictator from a chosen course of action. Certainly Saddam Hussein didn't suffer from them (just his people, and they were as irrelevant as the Iranian people are to their captors' policies).
However, what the London Guardian fearfully laments as a possible consequence of this toothless gesture is, in fact, precisely the form that economic sanctions should take. The Iranian economy is heavily dependent upon oil and natural gas exports, and the bulk of those exports have to go through the Strait of Hormuz. That suggests two self-evident factors: (1) the mullahs are bluffing about closing the strait themselves; and (2) that is precisely what we should do to bring about the mullahgarchy's fall. The Iranian economy, already is pretty sad shape, would rapidly collapse, the circumstances for a successful popular uprising would actually exist, and it might still be possible that regime-change could be effected in Tehran without a US-led invasion.
There you go. Impose economic sanctions worthy of the name by blockading the Persian Gulf, lend maximum support to an Iranian democratic insurgency, and wait for the mullahgarchy to topple.
Will we do that? Hell, no.
But since the '06 mid-term election, the pump price at my neighborhood filling station has risen thirty-four cents a gallon. So obviously the market is reacting to the high liklihood of an American retreat from the Middle East and like Iranian triumph. Could hanging the chief terror masters with their own commodity rope really be that much more economically painful, even in the short term?
No, not really. But that would require courage, foresight, and "realism"; commodities that are in dangerously short supply these days, as every last window of opportunity to avoid Armageddon slams shut one by one.
posted by JASmius at 2:43 PM
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