What To Do About North Korea

Charles Krauthammer suggests the following message be delivered by the Bush Administration to our good friend Kim jong-Il:

Given the fact that there is no other nuclear power so recklessly in violation of its nuclear obligations, it shall be the policy of this nation to regard any detonation of a nuclear explosive on the United States or its allies as an attack by North Korea on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon North Korea.

Of course, as Krauthammer himself points out, this straightforward deterrence policy only works if proliferation of said weapons can logically and/or easily be traced back to Pyongyang. Let, say, the Iranian mullahgarchy get into the same game - which they probably already are - and "holding rogue states accountable" becomes a bit more problematic. That, in turn, speaks to the long-delayed, and likely never-to-take-place, necessity of liberating Iran and crushing the mullahs once and for all. Sounds like a return to square one, doesn't it?

Andy McCarthy points out other problems. For one, the reality that there are WMD proliferators out there besides North Korea and Iran (e.g. Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan ring). For another, the Bushies' slavish return to obeisance to "international law":

Most of our allies (including those who would theoretically benefit from Krauthammer’s proposed threat to North Korea) have ratified Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Moreover, even though the United States has not ratified Protocol I — President Reagan having wisely declined to proceed with ratification in 1982 after the Carter administration signed it in 1977 — our government persists in a curious policy of self-abnegation: This flawed, rejected treaty is often regarded as if it were binding customary international law.

The Army Field Manual, for example, relies on it. Why is that relevant? Well, even with respect to military targets in wartime, Protocol I prohibits threatening — let alone carrying out — attacks in which it is ordered “that there shall be no survivors” (Article 40). Further, Protocol I flatly prohibits: attacks that target civilian populations, indiscriminate attacks, attacks which cannot be limited to military targets, attacks which hit military and civilian targets without distinction, and attacks in which the incidental loss of civilian life would be “excessive.” And it matters not whether such attacks are defensive responses to unjustified aggression.

In other words, the same old one-way street: the bad guys get to do horrible stuff, massacre civilians by the multitude, and that's okay because they're bad guys and that's to be expected, but the good guys don't get to retaliate or even threaten same to deter such attacks because good guys aren't allowed to fight fire with fire. Put more succinctly, our enemies can wage unrestricted, unfettered, unrestrained total war against us, but we may only respond while bound, gagged, blindfolded, shackled, handcuffed, and hamstrung. Better yet, just surrender instead. And Allah help us if we think to strike pre-emptively. Just ask the Israelis after their little skirmish with Hezbollah this past summer; they can tell you all about it.

Interestingly, McCarthy suggests moving up the food chain and directing Krauthammer's ultimatum at the ChiComms to coerce them into reining in their crazoid little client state. I'd put the odds on the Bush Administration in its current gelded state issuing such a statement at roughly below that of Rosie O'Donnell doing a centerfold photo shoot for Maxim magazine, but perhaps some sort of conversation is going on behind the scenes, based upon ChiComm actions of late - which appear to include consideration of....regime change:

The balance of risk between reform and chaos dominated arguments within China's ruling elite. The Chinese have also permitted an astonishing range of vituperative internet comment about an ally with which Beijing maintains a treaty of friendship and co-operation. Academic Wu Jianguo published an article in a Singapore newspaper - available online in China - bluntly saying: "I suggest China should make an end of Kim's Government."

"The Chinese have given up on Kim Jong-il," commented one diplomat. "The question is, what are they going to do about it?"

That question was not long in being answered:

China is prepared to step up pressure on North Korea in coming weeks by reducing oil shipments, among other measures, if the country refuses to return to negotiations or conducts more nuclear tests, Chinese government advisers and scholars who have discussed the matter with the leadership say.

If Beijing does take a tougher line on its neighbor and longtime ally, the action is likely to bolster its relationship with the United States. Washington has urged Chinese leaders to use all the tools at their disposal to put additional pressure on Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader.

Among the most potent of those tools is oil. China provides an estimated 80% to 90% of North Korea’s oil imports, shipped by pipeline at undisclosed prices that Chinese officials say represent a steep discount from the world market price. Any reduction in that aid could severely hamper North Korea’s already faltering economy.

Several leading Chinese experts said senior officials had indicated in the past week that they planned to slap new penalties on North Korea going beyond the ban on sales of military equipment imposed by the United Nations. But they would be likely to hold off if Mr. Kim agreed to return soon to multilateral talks North Korea has boycotted since September 2005. Years of talks have produced meager results. [emphasis added]

I think that last graf is the tell-tale on what Beijing is really thinking. Kim jong-Il is a very useful asset to Red China on the global chessboard - the ready-made bad cop to the good cop that the ChiComms are always seeking to play, a means of both cultivating American naivete and keeping the U.S. distracted and off-balance. But there is such a thing as overplaying a good hand, and the NoKos' nuclear test rides that ragged edge. The message to Kim from his patron seems crystal clear: Back off for now. Let the confirmed reality of a nuclear North Korea sink into the Western psyche; let the Americans and South Koreans and Japanese get used to it. And, of course, when our Iranian friends do their nuclear test, you'll have the cover to go full-bore on distributing your atomic wares to the highest bidder.

If Kim's smart, he bows, says, "Sir, yes sir," takes his (hopefully non-ticking) fortune cookie, goes home and takes another extended vacation, and this latest, largest storm blows over. If he's not down with his superiors' directive, or has come to believe his own press clippings, the ChiComms take him out and substitute a "more responsible" regime in Pyongyang, earning Western plaudits and gratitude, and probably investment as North Korea undergoes a China-like "opening" and "modernization," while we happily forget all about its nukes.

For Red China, it certainly beats the alternative of Japan and South Korea going nuclear in belated and alarmed self-defense. Something that we can rest assured is nowhere to be found in Beijing's master plan for eventual global domination.

It takes a great deal to "arouse" the West, and very little to "flaccidize" it. And nothing is a more effective "tool" to the task than the appearance of "going limp."